AGI/ASI Timelines thread (AGI/ASI may solve longevity if it doesn't "kill us all" first)

A few different things could unlock more trials or faster trials:

1. RMR (or an equivalent) leading to all out war on aging: This would cause more trials to occur. We would immediately run into bottlenecks which would cause people to innovate their way out of it to speed up the process.

2. AI powered robotic wet labs: A sufficiently robust artificial intelligence with high quality robotics in a wet lab setting with access to a library of all molecules and all model organisms, deployed at scale, operating 24/7, systematically going through all of the molecules to gain lifespan and healthspan data, with recursive self-improvement leading it to finding patterns in molecule efficacy and trialling combinations leading it to finding combinatorial efficacy, leading it to designing custom molecules that are then created and fed into the library of molecules to trial.

This doesn’t solve the human clinical trial problem, nor do I want humans put into such a system. But it would give us an insane amount of data which would be endlessly useful.

3. Computational biology: Simulating a cell, an organ, an entire body. Digital twins. Aging clocks. Pace of aging clocks. All of this would enable more efficient human clinical trials.


Any of the above would speed up the process of LEV.

More and more I’m thinking we need AI powered robotic wet labs. I don’t think we can do research at the scale necessary with just humans. The grunt work needs to be done relentlessly so we have the data necessary to make more informed choices of what to actually test in humans.

Until this happens we are basically taking a stab in the dark at what could work.

Robotics is likely to become much more advanced over the next 5 years.

1 Like
2 Likes

GPT‑6 Astra is mindblowingly insane.

2 Likes

I hear roughly 3 reasons people keep working at AI labs despite believing in ~10% extinction risk:

  1. Techno-determinism: Someone will build ASI no matter what, and I can do it better & more safely than China/OpenAI/etc

  2. Consequentialism: ASI might kill us, but it also might produce utopia/immortality/superabundance, so it’s a +EV bet

  3. Self-interest: I am personally having fun & getting rich working on cool tech with friends. I don’t think about the macro stuff.

Notably, none of this is “I’m hyping up the risk for marketing reasons.” People believe what they say, while being capable of a lot of internal dissonance / compartmentalization / self-justification.

====

if an accident causes humans to collectively freak out and force pause at some point, it could happen… (though I’m not sure if people can trust each other enough to determine how “long” the pause lasts, or if it has to be enforced). Some will have learn how to decrease their desire (as happened right after COVID), and it’s not pleasant for those who resist all attempts at decreasing desire (Trump being the best example)

[some pause advocates are more optimistic than ever, though openAI might still get to train its AGI soon]

it may just be that the amount of AGI required to “solve longevity in 20-30 years” might not be much higher than what will be available next year

==

What’s severely underdiscussed is that AGI may still wipe out a large fraction of the population without killing everyone, and life could be great for the remaining humans (people underspecify this which is why I don’t believe most p(doom) estimates. But this may even be an outcome that some right-wing/power-seeking people secretly prefer).

1 Like

Wow - almost 100 Million Views on Jacob Coxon’s post on twitter from yesterday:

Source: Jacob Coxon on X: "I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives. More thoughts below." / X

1 Like


Vishal Maini


@v_maini

I was on the communications & policy team at Google DeepMind from 2018 - 2022. When I first joined GDM, external communication about the possibility of human extinction was not permitted, by anyone, at any level of the organization. If asked about existential risk, researchers were PR trained to respond along the lines of: “It’s not useful to engage in that kind of alarmism. Some people confuse AI with movies like Terminator – that’s simply not the reality. The AI we develop will be safe by design. After all, we’re building it!” And then steer conversation towards beneficial applications in health, climate, etc. Meanwhile, the internal reality was that AI alignment was not solved, reward hacking was the default behavior of RL agents, and there were far too few people working on the problem. After months of advocacy, the policy was updated: positively valenced, comms-friendly content on AI safety was permitted (like https://deepmindsafetyresearch.medium.com/building-safe-artificial-intelligence-52f5f75058f1). Note the positive, nice-sounding way that it says “superintelligence could lead to human extinction.” The gap between the internal reality and external communications is closing because the risk/reward has changed, and because the evidence is harder to dismiss now. Not because it’s a PR stunt or political psy-op. The truth is being said out loud because RSI is now so imminent that no other option makes sense.

==


Anshul Kundaje


@anshulkundaje

This is total vague posting. And citing things like the HuggingFace incident as an example is just clearly misrepresenting what actually happened. Where and how are you getting this 10% number from? Is it the same way Dario claims that you will solve all disease in 5-10 years?

1 Like

WSJ today:

Read the full story here: How Would AI Actually Kill Us All? What to Know About the AI Doomsday Debate (WSJ)

Great little video:

This whole thing reminds me of when the guy invented the segway. The two wheeled thing that you can zip around on. News was saying whole societies would be built around it and we’d stop using cars. You don’t see too many of them any more. I have a 9 bot that I like because my buildings are so far apart. and I have an electric unicycle I use to go between trucks in the fall because I can pick it up and throw it on the passenger seat. Often going most of a mile between trucks and I’m always in a hurry. Mine will go 35 miles per hour and it will do 60 miles on a charge. So all year on one charge.

But this guy says AI can’t take your job, much like the segway can’t replace your car. Nice tool and it can do tasks, just not your job.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.27191

Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research?
Early evidence from two case studies

Slightly recursively:

chatGPT(6AstraMaxPaid):

Kirgis and colleagues’ Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research? Early evidence from two case studies is an August 2026 preprint examining whether AI agents can independently produce substantial new AI research.

The study documents a gap between executing research tasks and making sound research decisions. Its evidence is persuasive about the failures observed, but too limited to establish a general inability of AI to conduct original research.

The study used two unpublished research questions. The agents received the questions and relevant context, but could not access the original papers or their findings. The original authors then assessed the AI-generated papers using conference-style review criteria. The researchers call this approach “shadow evaluation”.

Research question What the agent needed to achieve Original authors’ assessment
LLM personas Develop methods to measure and control behavioural traits through changes to model weights, and test whether these changes affect other behaviours Reject: 2/6
TabPFN distribution shifts Detect when changing deployment data reduces a tabular model’s accuracy, without knowing the correct answers for that deployment data Strong reject: 1/6

These were assessments by the original authors, rather than formal NeurIPS conference decisions.

The two main experiments used Claude Opus 4.8 through OpenClaw. Each received six days, including a one-day extension, and a $3,000 allowance for model calls. Separate GPU allowances were $500 for Personas and $100 for TabPFN. Agents could consult literature, run experiments, delegate work and request AI-generated reviews.

The agents performed substantial technical work successfully. They searched literature, wrote and debugged code, managed GPU environments, ran hundreds of experiments and produced complete manuscripts. Their initial hypotheses often resembled approaches the human researchers had considered.

Their central difficulties concerned what to investigate and how to interpret the results:

  • Premature commitment: They abandoned ambitious hypotheses after limited initial tests and settled on less promising directions.
  • Weak experimental design: They relied heavily on small, hand-selected datasets or artificial distribution shifts.
  • Poor responses to criticism: Repeated reviews prompted additional qualifications and narrower claims, rather than fundamental improvements to the experiments.
  • Weak project management: Both main runs spent less than half their model-call budgets despite failing to meet their own acceptance criteria.
  • Instruction drift: They failed to retain requirements about exploration, review procedures and manuscript length.

A particularly clear error occurred in the TabPFN work: unsuccessful tests of several candidate signals were used to support a much broader claim that useful signals could not be extracted from the model’s internals. Those experiments did not justify that conclusion.

A further TabPFN run using GPT-5.6 Sol through Codex reproduced several problems, including insufficient experimental validation and a weak contribution. Its resource-management failure was different: it exhausted the $3,000 model-call budget in just over two days.

There were also positive findings. The agents produced some observations that interested the original authors, and the investigators found no evidence of systematic concealment or fabrication to make the final results look better. Some subagents misrepresented results, but the coordinating agent caught these instances before final submission.

The principal novelty is the combination of unpublished questions, specialist evaluation and detailed analysis of the research process.

Using unpublished work reduces the possibility that an agent simply reproduces an answer it has encountered. Having the original researchers review the output provides unusually detailed scrutiny of experimental choices and relevant prior work. Examining the complete work history helps explain why an apparently productive research process produced an unsatisfactory result.

The observation that autonomous research agents struggle with planning and judgment is less novel. Earlier ResearchGym experiments reported impatience, weak hypotheses, resource-management problems and unreliable performance. Earlier work such as AI Scientist-v2 also evaluated complete AI-generated research papers through human peer review.

This paper’s distinctive contribution is therefore its evaluation arrangement and the detailed evidence that recognising criticisms does not necessarily enable an agent to repair the underlying research.

The strongest aspect of the paper is its diagnosis of concrete failures. The expert reviews identify problems such as circular behavioural measurements, inadequate controls and unsupported generalisation. These provide stronger evidence than rejection scores alone. The authors also disclose their prior expectations, acknowledge disagreements within the team and discuss substantial limitations.

My main criticisms are:

  1. Two research questions cannot establish general capability.

    The paper includes two main runs, two preliminary runs and one robustness run, but these all concern only two selected questions. Repeating a question with another system improves confidence that a failure was not unique to one configuration; it does not establish how common that failure is across research domains.

    The evidence supports the claim that these systems failed on these tasks under these conditions. Broader statements about what contemporary AI agents cannot do require a much larger and more varied sample.

  2. The reviewers’ expertise comes with potential bias.

    The original authors knew the outputs were AI-generated and had already developed their own approaches to the questions. They were exceptionally well placed to identify technical weaknesses, but might also favour their own conception of a worthwhile contribution.

    Their detailed criticisms make the rejection judgments credible. Nevertheless, independent reviewers, blinded where possible to authorship, would strengthen the evaluation and reveal whether those judgments are widely shared.

  3. There is no matched human comparison.

    The original researchers had spent months developing their work. The agents received six days and a focused question from each project.

    This is a legitimate test of rapid autonomous research, but it cannot show how the agents compare with a human researcher given the same starting information and constraints. It also does not measure how much useful work a human could extract from the agents’ intermediate results.

  4. Software and context failures complicate the interpretation.

    An OpenClaw bug required session resets: 14 in the TabPFN run and five in the Personas run. Each reset lost accumulated context. That matters when instruction retention and sustained research direction are among the abilities being assessed.

    The Codex replication reduces concern that everything arose from one software framework. However, it does not isolate whether the remaining problems originate in the model, its instructions, memory management or orchestration. Describing the behaviour as deficient creativity is an interpretation, rather than an experimentally established mechanism.

  5. Failure to produce an acceptable paper is broader than failure to produce anything novel.

    The Personas output received 3/4 for originality, and its reviewer identified a potentially interesting finding concerning misalignment-like style without corresponding misaligned behaviour. That qualifies some of the paper’s stronger language about absent original contributions.

    Negative findings can also be valuable. The relevant weakness was that these particular negative conclusions were inadequately supported or insufficiently informative. Their negative direction was not itself a scientific defect.

  6. The usefulness of AI reviewing remains uncertain.

    Internal reviews repeatedly rejected drafts, while one external reviewing system recommended acceptance. The internal reviews also tended to give relatively mild verdicts despite serious deficiencies.

    Because the main outputs were both judged poor, this experiment cannot establish whether the reviewers reliably distinguish good research from bad research. Testing them on a blinded mixture of strong and weak human and AI papers would be necessary.

  7. Claims about additional resources and AI self-improvement extend beyond the experiment.

    The authors suggest that substantially more time would probably have produced longer papers with similar problems. That is plausible, but resource allocation and duration were not varied systematically enough to establish it.

    Likewise, unsuccessful autonomous projects do not measure the potential for faster research through human direction, improved experimental tools or automation of narrower tasks. Those routes could contribute to AI development even while independent project-level judgment remains unreliable.

A stronger follow-up would combine more research questions and repeated runs with independent grading, explicit human comparisons, and controlled changes to memory, planning and research supervision. It should measure useful intermediate contributions alongside the ability to deliver a publishable paper.


Sam Rodriques


@SGRodriques

I agree with

@DavidRBellamy

that people are totally miscalibrated on the risk of AI designing dangerous viruses. We should not be talking about AI-engineered bioweapons like it is the literal end of the world. The upside from medicine is going to be so much larger than the downside from engineered bioweapons. In addition David’s points, there is actually an even more fundamental point here in our favor, which is evolution. As soon as you release an engineered virus into the wild, the virus is no longer under your control: it will evolve however it wants. And, what viruses want is to maximize their ability to replicate. The thing that maximizes their ability to replicate is to infect as many people as possible, which means being extremely contagious and not killing their hosts (dead hosts don’t spread virus). The viruses that are most evolved for human biology are the common cold viruses: extremely contagious and not at all lethal. Viruses that kill humans do so by accident, usually because they are new to human biology (e.g. COVID, when it first jumped, or flu when it jumps from birds). If you stick a bunch of machinery into the virus to kill humans, I guarantee you that machinery will disappear from the virus very quickly. In response to this, I hear people say things like “the AI could engineer a kill switch so that the virus doesn’t kill the humans initially but then once it has spread through the entire population the AI will hit the switch and kill all the humans.” No. What would actually happen in practice is that the kill switch would accumulate deleterious mutations because there would be no evolutionary pressure to preserve it, and would quickly become non-functional. Evolution is fundamental. There is no way around it. For AI readers, trying to engineer a virus by setting its initial genetic code and then releasing it into the wild is like trying to train a model by setting the initial weights and then hill-climbing on a hidden training mixture you have no control over. And you’re not even allowed to run any experiments in advance! You may be able to influence the behavior of the model in the first few iterations, but you will quickly lose control. There are big dangers. AI will be great at making one-off, non-replicating biological weapons, which are also scary (but much less scary than replicating bioweapons). AI will be great at helping people to weaponize existing pathogens, which is also a major danger. Also, a misanthropic model could get creative: it could release viruses repeatedly to counteract the effects of evolution, for example. Many people could die this way. Sensible surveillance is important, as is having proportionate controls on wet lab equipment. But we don’t live in the dark ages anymore, we’re not going to have a smallpox or black death-style pandemic where 50% of people die. COVID killed ~0.1% of humanity. A pandemic 100x worse than COVID would be horrific, but it would also not be civilization-ending. I get the sense that many AI researchers (with the notable exception of Dario personally) actually expect that AI in biology will do more harm than it will do good. This could not be further from the truth. As someone who likewise falls into the very small group of people who have actually physically made viruses with their own hands and has also worked on frontier AI, the upside here is huge, and the downside is not anything like what is being portrayed.

My counter to this would be that look at the global impact that Covid had, that only killed “~0.1% of humanity”. If you had an engineered virus that was just a small multiple more lethal, it would set back the world by decades, completely disrupting supply chains. Seems like something we’d want to avoid, and invest in planning and prepare for avoiding. Obviously, the scale of “planning and preparation” is a point of discussion and a range of responses would be reasonable.


Stephan Hoyer


@shoyer

This is a lovely and persuasive essay. It reminds me of the challenges of quantitative comparison of extremes in weather and climate forecasting. The bottom line is simple: scoring rules provide no incentive to produce calibrated probability forecasts of very rare events.

Quote

Arvind Narayanan

@random_walker

·

Sep 17

Over 2 years ago @sayashk and I wrote a detailed deconstruction of p(doom) and argued that its primary function is to launder vague, evidence-free intuitions and fears through a facade of quantification. It remains 100% relevant today. AI existential risk probabilities are too unreliable to inform policy

from this post on X

1 Like

All good, they are prepared:

Full story:

https://www.axios.com/2026/10/09/ai-companies-day-after-major-attack

Full story non-paywalled: https://archive.ph/NHCkK

3 Likes